Rivero v Rivero Opinion Subsection Two

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Timeshare required for joint physical custody

nbsp;B. The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act; 10 U.S.C. § 1408 Congress reacted by enacting the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act ("USFSPA") on September 8,1982.10 The declared goal ofthe USFSPA, at the time of its ?passage, was to "reverse McCarty by returning the retired pay issue to the states.": Later reinterpretations indicated that this stated declaration of intent might not have totally overruled McCarty after all," but in any event treatment of retired pay was again made dependent on the divorce laws of the jurisdictions granting decrees. A military couple was married in Florida, where their first child was born, and moved to Nevada by reason of military transfer in 1991. Their second child was born in Las Vegas. In 1995, the mother filed for divorce; in 1996, they were awarded joint legal and physical custody, with the mother receiving temporary primary physical custody, and the father receiving four days of visitation per week. The parties reached a handwritten agreement which carried that custodial arrangement forward. The mother, feeling unable to sustain herself in Las Vegas, filed a petition to move. The lower court found on balance that the mother’s petition was brought in good faith, but nevertheless denied relocation based on an inability to fashion a feasible alternative visitation schedule. Specifically, the court found that the father’s work schedule made it impossible to compensate him for the time he would lose if the children moved (he was a firefighter, working four 24-hour shifts every eight days). The lower court had found that neither frequent short trips nor longer trips would work, given the ages of the children, the six-hour flying time between Florida and Nevada, the father’s work schedule. If the matter proceeds to litigation, the forum State will have to rule on where the military member is actually a "resident" and "domiciled." This can be far harder than it appears, especially since States diverge radically on the meaning of those terms. In some places "residence" is a physical question of location at the time of filing, while "domicile" is that permanent home "to which one returns." In other places, the meanings are reversed.1 In some States, residence and domicile have the same meaning.2 A service member who has close connections to more than one state will still only have one domicile.1 If the service member has significantly more connections to one state than another, then the state to which he has closer ties is his domicile.2 P> Immediately after that session, the Assembly Judiciary Committee deleted from the bill draft any mention of amending the how-to-calculate-the-penalty provision, rejecting the Welfare provision entirely.2 Most family law lawyers have no idea how close the penalty provision came to being gutted and replaced, requiring everyone in Nevada to adopt the same counterproductive methodology used in NOMADS - and all because Welfare could not update its computer system. It is unknown whether Welfare will try again. In the Matter of Parental Rights as to Carron, 114 Nev. 370, 956 P.2d 785 (1998) The child in question was born to unmarried parents in May 1996. The then 18 year old mother had moved in with the father’s family for a year and a half in 1994. She discovered she was pregnant in October 1995, and claimed that she immediately told the father and his parents (they denied it). She claimed (and he denied) that she found heroin in his wallet, and ended their relationship in November 1995. In December 1995, the mother moved to Las Vegas and moved in with her mother. She claims that she informed the father in January 1996, that she was putting the baby up for adoption and needed his consent. He denied any such conversation took place, and his mother testified as to her belief that the pregnancy was a hoax. In 1907, the husband entered into an agreement to purchase a ranch, with the purchase price being payable in annual installments. The opinion is not specific as to exactly when, but another tract of land was purchased prior to marriage. In 1908, the parties married. A deed was executed in 1910, granting the property to the husband. Later in 1910, the husband and wife entered into an agreement to sell the property. Some of the recitals in the sales agreement indicated that the husband and wife joined in the agreement to sell, that payment was to be made to both parties. The purchase price for the property was paid for in 1911. Subsequently, and prior to the divorce, two tracts of land were purchased. In 1916, the parties divorced. The husband died in 1918 intestate with the tracts of land still in his name. The question for the district court was whether the property was community or separate. The district court ruled that the wife was the owner, of an undivided half-interest in two of said tracts of land, and of an undivided 82/100 interest in one of tracts. The decree awarded entire military retirement to husband, but ordered him to pay to the former spouse, by military allotment, the sum of $200 plus cost of living adjustments, as "permanent alimony." Facts showed that military service overlapped marriage by just less than ten years, precluding direct payment of a property award through the military pay center. The wife remarried and the husband sought to terminate the payments. The district court ordered the payments stopped. 3. Exclusive continuing jurisdiction for the State that entered the decree. The failure of the UCCJA to clearly enunciate that the decree-granting State retains exclusive continuing jurisdiction to modify a decree has resulted in two major problems. First, different interpretations of the UCCJA on continuing jurisdiction have produced conflicting custody decrees. States also have different interpretations as to how long continuing jurisdiction lasts. Some courts have held that modification jurisdiction continues until the last contestant leaves the State, regardless of how many years the child has lived outside the State or how tenuous the childfs connections to the State have become. Other courts have held that continuing modification jurisdiction ends as soon as the child has established a new home State, regardless of how significant the childfs connections to the decree State remain. Still other States distinguish between custody orders and visitation orders. This divergence of views leads to simultaneous proceedings and conflicting custody orders. As discussed above, it is possible to restrict the SBP to only secure the former spouse’s lifetime interest - i.e., to arrange things so that she would get the same amount if the member died that she received while he remained alive. Notably, it is not possible to similarly restrict the member’s interest; no matter what the court does, the member will retain an automatic reversion of all the money paid to the former spouse, if she dies first.7 In the next four scenarios, then, if the spouse dies first, the member gets the full gross military retirement benefits, but if the member dies first, the spouse continues to get only her share of the benefits. programs were passed in tandem. First, CRSC was expanded to include all combat-related disabilities or operations-related disabilities,1 from 10% to 100% ratings, effective January 1, 2004, and extended to Guard and Reserve members. CRSC payments are explicitly defined as not being "retired pay."2 The situation is quite different when the former spouse sends in a "deemed election" after a court orders the beneficiary designation, but without the active cooperation of the member. In prior years, it was widely believed that the one-year period in which a former spouse must request a deemed election ran concurrently with the one-year period in which a member must make the election after the divorce. It was therefore thought that the former spouse simply lost the SBP designation entirely if he or she waited until the member’s one-year election period ended. That attorney not only had the paralegal sit in on all conference calls and in every meeting, but had her do all the talking at the settlement conference. The attorney looked like a fool, and his client was effectively betrayed. B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount of the disposable ret red pay of a member payable by the Secretary concerned under all court orders pursuant to this section and all legal processes pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) with respect to a member may not exceed 65 percent of the amount of the retired pay payable to such member that is considered under section 462 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 662) to be remuneration for employment that is payable by the United States. Quoting at length from a law review article analyzing the mathematics of the situation, the court found that acceptance of the husband’s argument would have allowed him to collect the entirety of the accumulating "earnings" on the marital property accumulated by both parties. Three judges dissented.1 Very quickly (in Congressional terms), bills were introduced and debated, and in September, 1982, Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, or "USFSPA," 10 U.S.C. § 1408, to "reverse McCarty by returning the retired pay issue to the states." The USFSPA does not give the spouse of a service member any right under federal law to claim a share of the service member’s retired pay; it was an enabling statute that allowed state courts to divide military retirement income according to their own state laws after June 26, 1981, the same way that they had prior to that date.3 They also suggest a dramatic change in such rules, expressly stating that contingent fees should be permitted in most domestic relations matters. Bound Standard 4.5 (2000): Use the following paragraph if ALL credits accrued by the Member accrued during the marriage. Substitute "No withdrawals of employee contributions" for the last sentence, if that is the position agreed, preferred, or ordered. The parties were married in 1955. In 1956, a parcel of real property was conveyed to the wife, as a married woman, with a recitation in the deed that it was to be her sole and separate property. The wife died in 1967. The wife left her husband $2,500 and left the remainder of her estate to her daughter. The husband died later in 1967. The husband’s executor brought an action for declaratory relief requesting that the parcel be declared community property and that an undivided one-half interest be set over as a part of the estate of the husband. The district found the parcel to be community property and ordered that it be equally divided between the two estates. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court advised that NRS 125B.110 indicated that there was a strong public policy that handicapped children should be supported until they are no longer handicapped or become self-supporting. The Court further indicated that the statute indicated a strong public policy that could not be vitiated by stipulation or agreement of the parties. A stipulation to the contrary was of no effect and did not bind the parties. The Court held that to the extent the stipulation and order were inconsistent with NRS 125B.110, they are of no effect and did not bind the parties. The matter was remanded for findings consistent with NRS 125B.110. The organized family law Bar must become more proactive in the legislative process. Too much, we have allowed private lobbying groups to speak for the family law bar. Experience has shown clearly that those organizations, and their representatives, have political and personal agendas considerably beyond looking out for equity, impartiality, and logic in family law. nbsp;B. The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act; 10 U.S.C. § 1408 Congress reacted by enacting the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act ("USFSPA") on September 8,1982.10 The declared goal ofthe USFSPA, at the time of its ?passage, was to "reverse McCarty by returning the retired pay issue to the states.": Later reinterpretations indicated that this stated declaration of intent might not have totally overruled McCarty after all," but in any event treatment of retired pay was again made dependent on the divorce laws of the jurisdictions granting decrees. The point is not whether a formulaic approach is good policy, providing helpful bright-line rules; or bad policy, creating a hostile "on the clock" mentality inconsistent with truly cooperative joint parenting. On this, reasonable policymakers differ, as the foreign state statutes catalogued, ante at p. 14 n.5 and p. 16 n.6, reflect. The point is that percentage time/support formulas are for the Legislature to evaluate, not for the court to establish by fiat. Rather, this is a situation where ¨C at least collectively ¨C the lawyers have to look right in the mirror. I am sure that some of those volunteering their time and efforts to serve the bar process are diligent and deserve commendation for donating their time. That said, fault lies with those "volunteers" who are apparently more interested in having publicly visible positions than actually doing the work called for by those positions, and with the organized Bar structure which is (or should be) aware of this problem, but so far as can be seen, has done nothing of consequence to address it. B> [ALT] 8. The Member is required to elect a form of benefit that would pay to the Alternate Payee (in the event of the Member’s death prior to that of the Alternate Payee), a sum equal to the amount that would be paid to Alternate Payee under Option One (the unreduced benefit) under the formula set out above. This Order shall be considered by the retirement system to be a deemed election of whatever form of benefit shall accomplish that result.

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